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Mapp's Exclusionary Rule: Is the
Court Crying Wolf?
Michael Vitiello*
Jane C. Burger**
I.

Introduction

Although economics and military preparedness dominated the
1980 presidential campaign, the possibility of the appointment of
several Justices to the United States Supreme Court was an important campaign issue.' Justice Potter Stewart announced his resignation from the Court in June of 1981 and Sandra D. O'Connor has
already been selected by President Reagan as Stewart's replacement.2 It is rumored that Justices Brennan and Marshall will resign
from the bench at some proximate point. Brennan is expected to
resign because of the poor health of his wife and Marshall because of
his own failing health. 3 The age and health of other Justices make it
probable that President Reagan will make a number of appoint* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law; B.A. 1969,
Swarthmore College; J.D. 1974, University of Pennsylvania.
** Currently a senior law student at Loyola University School of Law; B.A. 1977, University of New Orleans. The authors wish to thank Dr. Jack Wright, Jr., Associate Professor,
Loyola University, for his assistance in developing statistical methodology. Support for this
article was provided by the Alfred J. Bonomo, Sr., Family Scholarship Fund.
1. The following report of a speech given by then President Carter during the campaign
appeared in a weekly news magazine:
After praising himself as the President who has "appointed more black judges than
any in U.S. history," Carter warned that a change might occur if he were replaced by
a Republican. "The U.S. Supreme Court has been the final bulwark of freedom.
You just think about what will happen with another three or four appointments."
Time, July 14, 1980, at 17. See also Slonim, Picking FederalJudges, 66 A.B.A.J. 1185 (1980);
Witt, Reagan As President Could Change Face of U.S. High Court, Commercial Appeal, July
27, 1980, § A, at 6, col. 1. Candidate Reagan responded to criticism from Carter supporters
who raised the fear that Reagan would appoint anti-abortion and right wing judges to the
federal bench. See Turner, Reagan Says He Would Not Use Single-Issue Test To Pick Judges,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 2. See also Taylor, CarterJudge Selections Praised,But
Critics Discern Partiansho, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1980, § A, at 1,col. 1.
2. O'Connor .testified at her confirmation hearings that the exclusionary rule "may
have" contributed to an increase in the crime rate, and that she would be receptive to a modification of the rule. The Wash. Post, Sept. 11, 1981, § A, at 2, col. 2.
3.

See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN, 154, 188, 358-59, 441 (1979).

ments to the Court.4 The Republicans endorsed a platform plank
promising that their candidate would appoint judges at all levels of
the judiciary "who respect traditional family values and the sanctity
of innocent human life."5 Undoubtedly, President Reagan wil view
such a plank as an invitation to appoint conservative judges.6
During his 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon attacked
the Warren Court's decisions enlarging the rights of criminal defendants and vowed to appoint Justices who would reverse the Warren
Court trend.7 In part, Nixon's Justices have brought about the
promised impact. Although the Burger Court has not overruled the
major decisions from the 1960's, it has seldom expanded those holdings and has frequently eroded their principles.' For example, the
Court granted certiorari to review Mapp v. Ohio9 and Mirandav. Arizona. '0 Both decisions withstood review, but narrowly."I
The Justices appointed to the Supreme Court during the next
four years by President Reagan will serve a significant role in shaping the Court's posture on the rights of criminal defendants. An

analysis of the Burger Court decisions reveals an instability of majorities within the Court.' 2 Those majorities will be reshaped with
4. Taylor, CarterJudge Selections Praised,But CriticsDiscern Partisanship, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 3, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 2; Witt, Reagan As President Could Change Face of U.S. High
Court, Commercial Appeal, July 27, 1980, § A, at 6, col. 1. Five Justices are over 70 years of
age: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Blackmun.
5. Taylor, supra note 1,at 20, col. 1.
6. "Mr. Reagan has expressed a preference for convervative judges who will not 'invade
the prerogative of the legislature.'" Id
7. See Howard, State Courtsand ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62
VA. L. REv. 873, 893 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); United
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Seegenerally Chase, The Burger Court, The Individual,and the CriminalProcess.-Directionsand Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 518 (1977).
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11. See notes 86-97 and accompanying text infra. In 1975, the Court granted certiorari in
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). One major question presented was whether a more
flexible police interrogation standard should be adopted to replace the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona. Twenty-one states as amici curiae urged that the Court overrule Miranda
Id at 438. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Miranda question was avoided and the case was
decided on the basis of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), concerning the sixth
amendment right to counsel. Justice Stewart, a dissenter in Miranda, wrote for the Williams
majority in a 5-4 decision.
One scholar has noted that although the Williams court avoided decision on the continued
validity of Miranda, it also avoided relying on Miranda and maintained its record of not holding "a single item of evidence inadmissible on the authority of Miranda" since Chief Justice
Burger assumed his post in June, 1969. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Mfiranda"
What Is Interrogation? When Does it Matter, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 78-80 (1978) (footnotes omitted). But see Edwards v. Arizona, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). See generaly Kamisar,
Foreword- Brewer Y. Williams - .4Hard Look at a Discomfitting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209
(1977).
12. See Newsweek, July 14, 1980, at 22.

the addition of new Justices, especially if President Reagan selects
the replacements for the Court's remaining liberals. It is reasonable
to assume that Reagan
appointees will decide to limit the rights of
3

criminal defendants.1

The particular concern of this article is the exclusionary rule of
Mapp v. Ohio. Although it withstood the Court's review, it has been
heatedly attacked by critics on the Court' 4 and in the legal community. t5 Mapp has been eroded almost from its inception. ' 6 Four Justices currently on the Court have expressed strong dissatisfaction

with the exclusionary rule 7 and Mapp appears particularly vulnerable after Justices Brennan and Marshall are no longer on the

Id

Once again, the Burger court defied simplistic efforts to fit into a neat liberal or conservative mold ...
If there was any thread running through the end-of-term decisions, it had to do
with the style of the Court's rulings, not their substance. These nine Justices repeatedly speak in separate voices, not in unison. Their failing coalitions seem to try everything but consensus; in one case, they offered seven separate opinions.
See also Time, July 14, 1980, at 10.
[Clourt watchers customarily try to ascertain where the court as a whole stands,
whether it is moving toward conservatism or liberalism, toward activism or judicial
restraint. The only answer is that the court is deeply divided. The four cases decided
last week produced a total of no fewer than 22 concurring and dissenting opinions,
which filled a total of 345 pages.

Id
13. Speaking in Birmingham, Alabama, Reagan commented:
"Time and again in recent years, we have seen the Supreme Court override public
opion concerning school prayer, forced busing, the treatment of criminals..
There must be new justices on the Court, women and men who respect and reflect the
values and morals of the American majority. I pledge to make such appointments."
Slonim, Picking Federal Judges, 66 A.B.A.J. 1185, 1186-87 (1980).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976): "The debate within the
Court on the exclusionary rule has always been a warm one." See also Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
15. See, e.g., Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974);
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970);
Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule.- Have Proponents Proven That ItIs a Deterrent to Police,
62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule. Why Suppress Valid Evidence 62
JUDICATURE 214 (1978); Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw.
L.J. 573 (1971); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free Ifthe Constable Blunders, 50 TEx. L. REV.
736 (1972).
16. That process began with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), which denied
retroactive application of Maplp to state convictions that had become final prior to Mapp.
17. Chief Justice Burger has been most critical of the rule. He initially hesitated to overrule Mapp in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), but subsequently advocated overruling the decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). More recently, the Chief Justice,
joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, characterized a holding of the Court as "another
manifestation of the practical poverty of the judge-made exclusionary rule." Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U.S. 85, 97 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist authored the Court's opinion in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). One scholar noted,
The principle [in Peltier] is so broadly stated, and the majority's dislike of the suppression doctrine is so apparent, that Justice Brennan, who has emerged as the
Court's most vocal defender of the doctrine, feared the principle would spill over into
ordinary search and seizure cases that do not involve questions of retroactivity.
Geller, Enforcing The Fourth Amendment. The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975
WASH. U. L.Q. 621, 636. Justice White announced his readiness to modify Mapp in his dissenting opinion in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Justice
Powell expressed a willingness to develop a sliding scale of fourth amendment violations in
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 606 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part).

Court.' 8 Chief Justice Burger challenged the exclusionary rule more
than five years before his appointment to the Court. 9 Shortly after
appointment he began his attack in earnest. Burger has characterized the rule as "conceptually sterile and practically ineffective" in
deterring illegal police conduct.2" Thus, he has attempted to shift the
burden to supporters of the rule to show that the rule accomplishes
its stated objective. 2 '
Supreme Court decisions eroding the exclusionary rule have focused on the rule's cost to society and its limited proven deterrent
value.22 The Court has balanced the marginal deterrent value of the
rule when applied to civil proceedings with the cost to society of applying the rule and concluded that extension of the rule was not justified.2 3
The erosion of the exclusionary rule that has already occurred

may become partial justification for overruling Mapp in the near future. Historically, the Supreme Court has seldom directly overruled
precedents.2 4 Its reluctance to do so may be explained by the need to
preserve its image as an impartial decision-maker adhering to fundamental constitutional values.2 One commentator persuasively suggests that there is an "art" to overruling a prior case that preserves
the image of transcendent principle.26 A component of that art is the
erosion of the earlier case by subsequent cases. The Court may rely
on erosion to show that the new rule is not a product of the new
Justices, but the work of many Justices over time.27 Section II of this
18. Justices Brennan and Marshall have been the most consistent supporters of Mapp.
See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 41 (1979) (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall and
Stevens, JJ., joined, dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502 (1976) (Brennan, J., with
whom Marshall, J., joined, dissenting); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (1976) (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J., joined, dissenting); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544
(1975) (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J., joined, dissenting); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974) (Brennan, J., with whom Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined, dissenting).
19. Burger, Who Will Watch The Watchman, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964).
20. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Burger has also referred to the rule as a "Draconian, discredited
device in its present absolutist form." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
21. 403 U.S. at 416.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980); Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
23. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
24. [D]espite its widespread reputation as a Court most ready to "disregard precedent and overrule its own earlier decisions," the Supreme Court in fact has directly
overruled prior decisions on no more than a hundred occasions in over a century and
a half of judicial review. And only about half of these instances involved cases...
in which the Court was dealing with a constitutional question.
Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art"ofOverruling, [19631 S. CT. REv. 211, 213-14 (footnotes omitted).
25. Id at 216-17.
26. Id
27. Other grounds for overruling cases are changing conditions and the lessons of experi-

article demonstrates the erosion of Mapp that may be used to overrule it.
The arguments surrounding the exclusionary rule focus on several issues: (1) its effectiveness as a deterrent,28 (2) the adequacy of
alternatives, 29 and (3) the constitutional status of the rule itself.30 A
major premise of the argument against the exclusionary rule is that
the cost to society of "the release of countless criminals" is too
great. 3 ' A recent study of the federal system indicates that the cost to
society may be overstated. The study found that in a sample of almost 3000 defendants charged with a crime, evidence was suppressed
on fourth amendment grounds in only 1.3 percent of the cases examined.3 2 Another study indicates a low rate of suppression in state
felony cases.3 3 Section III of this article reports the research of the
authors on the application of the rule in state appellate courts. The
authors' findings also suggest that the exclusionary rule's cost to society has been exaggerated. Any modification or abandonment of the
rule, therefore, should be preceded by a review of the research and a
reappraisal of the rule's actual costs.
II. The Exclusionary Rule: Its Erosion
A4.

Background

The fourth amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonence. "There are very few such cases in which the Court has not employed one or the other
[rationale]." Id at 226.
28. See, e.g., Canon, A Postscript on EmpiricalStudies and the Exclusionary Rule, 62
JUDICATURE 455 (1979); Canon, The Exclusionary Rule. Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't
Deter Police, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties
Policies at the State andFederalLevels, 5 AM. POLITICS Q. 57 (1977); Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health. 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970); Schlesinger, The ExclusionaryRule.- Have
ProponentsProven That It Isa Deterrentto Police, 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979); Spiotto, Search
and Seizure. An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives,2 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 243 (1973); Critique, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 740 (1974).
29. See, e.g., ALl Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures §§ 8.02C2) (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1971); Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974);
Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment." The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives [1975]
WASH. U. L.Q. 621; Kamisar, Is the ExclusionaryRule an 'Illogical'or 'Unnatural'Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 62 JUDICATURE 67 (1978); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule.
Why Suppress Valid Evidence 62 JUDICATURE 215 (1978); Wright, Must the CriminalGo Free
Ifthe Constable Blunders, 50 TEx. L. REV. 736 (1972).
30. See Kamisar, Is the ExclusionaryRule an "Illogical'or 'Unnatural'Interpretation of
the FourthAmendment 62 JUDICATURE 67 (1978); Wilkey, The ExclusionaryRule." Why Suppress Valid Evidence 62 JUDICATURE 215 (1978).
31. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 416.
32.

REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL ON THE IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY

RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS (1979). The Report appears to diminish one
hidden cost of the exclusionary rule. Prosecutors often decline to prosecute because of known
fourth amendment violations, but the Report cites search and seizure problems as the primary
reason in only 0.4% of the cases in which prosecution was declined.
33. Brasi, A Cross-City Comparison ofFelony Case Processing (1979).

able searches and seizures." 4 Unlike the fifth amendment's direct
command against the use of compelled testimony,"5 the fourth
amendment contains no express remedy. It was not until 1914 that
the Court created a remedy for effectuation of the rights protected by
the fourth amendment.3 6 Thirty-five years later, the Court held in
Wofv. Colorado37 that the core of the protection found in the fourth
amendment was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and
therefore applicable to the states.3 Wolf rejected, however, the
Weeks v.United States39 exclusionary rule, which applied only in
federal courts.40
B.

Mapp v. Ohio

Wolf survived less than twelve years, when the Court reversed
itself in Mapp v. Ohio . In the interim, according to Justice Clark's

opinion in Mapp, decisions by the Supreme Court eroded the foundation of Wolf 42 Specifically, Justice Clark cited the rejection of the
"silver platter" doctrine in Elkins v. UnitedStates, 43 the expansion of
standing in Jones v. United States, 4 and the use of injunction to prevent federal officials from handing over illegally seized evidence to
state officials in Rea v. UnitedStates.45 The opinion focused on the
lessons of experience,' which proved that Wofs factual assumptions were erroneous.4 7
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd
involved a forfeiture proceeding in which Boyd was compelled to produce private books and
papers. The Supreme Court held that compulsory production was barred by both the fourth
and fifth amendments. While the fifth amendment is now limited to testimonial evidence,
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
Boyd provided the first indication that the exclusionary remedy may be based on the fourth
amendment. See Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment. The Exclusionary Rule and Its 41ternadives, [19751 WAsH. U. L.Q. 621. See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 (1976).
36. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (defendant may petition before trial for
the return of evidence seized illegally by federal authorities); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921) (illegally seized evidence cannot be used at trial). See also Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (prohibited the use of copies of illegally seized evidence at trial). Prior to Weeks, the Court adhered to the common-law rule prohibiting a court
from asking how the evidence was obtained. See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
37. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
38. Id at 27-28.
39. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
40. 338 U.S. at 31.
41. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42. Id at 653.
43. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The silver platter doctrine allowed the use of evidence in federal
court if it had been seized by state agents.
44. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Jones allowed anyone legitimately on searched premises to object to the search.
45. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
46. See generally Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright. The 'Wrt" of Overruling, (1963] S. CT.
REv.211.
47. "The [WoIfA Court's reasons for not considering essential to the right to privacy, as a
curb imposed upon the States by the Due Process clause, that which decades before had been
posited as part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's limitation upon federal encroachment

Mapp was decided by a divided court, which is consistent with
most of the Court's decisions concerning the exclusionary rule.4"
Misgivings about the rule are numerous. Critics claim that because

the rule is unique to American jurisprudence, it is not fundamental

to an Anglo-American scheme of justice.49 Many critics espouse Justice Cardozo's position that the rule produces an anomalous result
since the "criminal [goes] free because the constable has blundered."5 0
Furthermore, the rule does nothing to punish the offending officer, but leaves society without a remedy against the criminal defendant. Both wrongdoers may go unpunished. 5 Nor does the rule
protect the innocent person who is unlawfully searched.5 2 The rule

also distorts the fact-finding process because it withholds highly probative evidence from the trier of fact,53 which often results in a remedy that is disproportionate to the minor wrong done to the
defendant.5 4 Additionally, substantial concern exists that the rule
does not deter police misconduct.55
of individual privacy, were bottomed on factual considerations." 367 U.S. at 650-51. Justice
Clark pointed out the acceptance of the exclusionary rule by a majority of states that considered the question after Wolf and the California Supreme Court's conclusion that alternative
remedies were worthless. Id at 652.
48. See note 14 supra. Except for a unanimous decision in Week.s, "the evolution of the
exclusionary rule has been marked by sharp divisions in the Court." United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 443, 446 (1976). Indeed, Wolf Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), Mapp and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), produced a total of 27 separate signed opinions or statements.
49. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Martin, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law--Canada,
52 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 271 (1961); Williams, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign LawEngland, 52 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 272 (1961).
50. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
51. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), held that a warrantless arrest made in
accordance with New York's Code of Criminal Procedure was unlawful. The arrest took place
on January 14, 1970, over 10 years before the issue was finally resolved. The police conduct
was affirmed by two state courts before it was successfully challenged in the United States
Supreme Court. It is doubtful that a police officer feels he has been punished by the suppression of evidence he obtained unlawfully 10 years prior to the determination. See People v.
Payton, 55 App. Div. 2d 859, 390 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1976); People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 408
N.Y.S.2d 395, 380 N.E.2d 224 (1978).
52. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). See also Taft, Protecting the Public
from Mapp v. Ohio Without Amending the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815 (1964).
53. See Levin, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rulefor Fourth Amendment Violations,
58 JUDICATURE 74 (1974).
54. See Friendly, The Bill af Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
929 (1965).
55. As currently administered, the exclusionary rule imposes no personal penalty on the
officer involved in the illegal activity, or on the police department for which he works. The
greatest sanction imposed is at best the disappointment felt by the officer for allowing a criminal to return to the street. Even that disappointment, however, may not be felt by the officer
because exclusion often occurs several years after the illegal conduct. See Oaks, Studing the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).

C

The Erosion of Mapp v. Ohio

1. Cost-Benefit Analysis.-When the division of the Court in
Mapp and the extensive misgivings about the rule are considered, it
is not startling that the erosion of Mapp commenced almost from its
inception. Mapp relied explicitly on two separate justifications.
First, "the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter - to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it.' "56 Second,
Justice Clark, writing for the majority in Mapp, premised the exclusionary rule on its contribution to concepts of judicial integrity:
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him
free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of
its own existence." 57 By denying retroactive application to Mapp,
however, Justice Clark construed the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule as its deterrent effect on police illegality.5" He reasoned
that deterrence would not be served by retroactive application because the lawless conduct had already taken place.5 9
In United States v. Calandra,6 0 the Court held that a grand jury
witness could not refuse to answer questions even if the source of the
questions was evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
Justice Powell referred to deterrence as the "prime purpose" of the
rule and did not mention the judicial integrity rationale.6" Obviously, grand jury proceedings can be tainted as easily as a trial
through the use of evidence procured by government-sanctioned
lawlessness. By limiting the justification of the rule to the purpose of
deterrence, however, Justice Powell provided the basis for a series of
decisions that substantially narrowed Mapp's application.
Calandra follows a cost-benefit analysis: Does the limited incremental deterrent value of an application of the rule in a given context outweigh the cost to society and the criminal justice system?
Justice Powell-explained that "the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served. . . . [W]e must weigh the potential injury
56. 367 U.S. at 656.
57. Id at 659. See also Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1968) (evidence seized by
state officials in violation of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 is inadmissible).
58. See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965); Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244, 249 (1969).
59. Mapp was not entirely prospective. It did apply to cases still pending on direct review when Mapp was decided. 367 U.S. at 622. See also Stone v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963).
60. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
61. Id at 347. In United States v. Janis, Justice Blackmun cited Calandrafor the proposition that "[t]he Court ... has established that the 'prime purpose' of the rule, f not the sole
one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct'." 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (emphasis added).

to the historic role and functions of the grand jury against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in this context." 62 Predictably,
once the Court introduced a new analysis, the balance tipped against
application of the rule because of uncertainty whether any increased
deterrent effect could be achieved by extension of the rule.6 3
Calandra'sbalancing approach has limited Mapp's application.
In UnitedStates v. Janis,I the Court found that Mapp did not apply
in civil tax assessment proceedings. The application of the exclusionary rule would hamper "the enforcement of admittedly valid
laws" 6 5 by making unavailable concededly probative evidence. This
cost outweighed the marginal and empirically unverifiable deterrent
value that could possibly be derived from the exclusion of the evidence. Thus, the Court found that extension of the exclusionary rule
was unjustified.66
The Calandracost-benefit analysis was also applied in Stone v.
Powell,6 7 in which the Court held that state prisoners who had a full
and fair hearing on their fourth amendment claims in state court
could not relitigate those claims in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Justice Powell listed the costs of the rule as the diversion of the
focus of trial from guilt and innocence of the defendant to a collateral issue, the exclusion of what may be the most probative evidence,
the possible disparity between a minor violation of the law and the
windfall release of the guilty, and the disrespect for the law created
by indiscriminate use of the rule.6 8 Balanced against the costs was
the assumed deterrent effect of the rule. The Court concluded that
the costs outweighed "the additional contribution, if any, of the consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collat-

eral review.

"69

62. 414 U.S. at 348-49.
63. Id at 351.
64. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
65. Id at 447.
66. Id at 454. In light of Janis, the continued vitality of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), which applied Mapp to forfeiture proceedings, is questionable.
67. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
68. Id at 490-91.
69. Id at 493. See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980); United
States v. Salvucci, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).

In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 129 (1978),

the Court restricted standing to those who claimed a legitimate expectation of privacy: "Respondents . . . seek to retain the [automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States] on the
grounds that it is said to maximize the deterrence of illegal police conduct by permitting an
expanded class of potential challengers. The same argument has been rejected by this
Court ..
" - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 2554. In Stone v. Powell, unlike Calandra, Justice
Poweli addressed judicial integrity as a justification for the exclusionary rule and underscored
its limited vitality:
Logically extended this justification would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, or even over his
assent. It also would require abandonment of the standing limitations on who may
object to the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence and retreat from the

2 The Good Faith Exception.-- Critics of Mapp agree that
there must be an effective remedy for fourth amendment violations.7" The exclusion of evidence, if it has any deterrent effect at
all,7' only deters those who are aware that their conduct is unlawful.
An officer's good faith belief that he is acting lawfully overcomes his
concern that the evidence may subsequently be suppressed.72 Thus,
it is argued that the exclusionary rule should apply only if the court
finds that the officer did not act in good faith.7 3 In some contexts, the
Court has suggested that conduct must also be reasonable,7 4 although it is arguable that an unreasonable but honest officer will not
be deterred by the additional requirement that his conduct be reasonable.7 5
The Supreme Court relied on the good faith test in its decisions
denying retroactive application of the exclusionary rule. In Fuller v.
Alaska, 76 the Court disallowed retroactive application of Lee v. Florida 77 because a contrary ruling would require every state conviction
obtained in reliance on Schwartz v. Texas 78 to be overturned. 79 The
Burger Court adhered to the Fuller line of cases in United States v.
0
Peltier,"
which implied support for a broader application of the
proposition that judicial proceedings need not abate when the defendant's person is
unconstitutionally seized. Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings. Nor does it
require that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to result in conviction in some
cases. . . . While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the
exclusion of highly probative evidence.
428 U.S. at 485-86 (footnotes and citations omitted).
70. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). "I do not question the need for some remedy to give meaning and
teeth to the constitutional guarantees against unlawful conduct by government officials." Id
71. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1976). "[A]lthough scholars
have attempted to determine whether the exclusionary rule in fact does have any deterrent
effect, each empirical study on the subject, in its own way, appears to be flawed." Id (footnote
omitted).
72. To the extent that this argument is reasonable, it is because the Court has focused on
specific deterrence of the particular officer, not on general deterrence. See United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556-60 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge,
that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Id at 542. See also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
75. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 850 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied - U.S. -,
101 S.Ct. 946 (1980). Proponents of the reasonableness requirement argue that the good faith
rule, without more, creates a disincentive to educate police officers.
76. 393 U.S. 80 (1968).
77. 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
78. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
79. See also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965).
80. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).

good faith test.
Peltier raised the question of the retroactivity of Almeida
Sanchez v. United States.8 Almeida Sanchez required that roving
border patrols have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contained illegal aliens before the patrol could search the vehicle. In
Peltier, Justice Rehnquist stated that judicial integrity is not offended when the police "reasonably believed in good faith that their
conduct was in accordance with the law ..
."82 Without limiting
his analysis to the retroactivity question, he argued that the exclusionary rule is applied only in "'those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served.'"83 Justice Rehnquist concluded that "evidence obtained from a search should be
suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had
knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the
search was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment. ' 84 The
significance of this approach was noted by Justice Brennan in his
dissent:
I have no confidence that the new formulation is to be confined to
putative retroactivity cases. Rather, I suspect that when a suitable
opportunity arises, today's revision of the exclusionary rule will be
pronounced applicable to all search-and-seizure cases. . . . The
new formulation obviously removes the very foundation of the exclusionary rule as it has been expressed in countless decisions . ... -5
Contrary to Justice Brennan's prediction, the exclusionary rule
narrowly survived total revision in search and seizure cases. In Wof
v. Rice,8 6 the court avoided a modification of the rule "to admit evidence obtained by good faith conduct of police where exclusion
would have no deterrent effect," 87 and decided the case on the
ground that 88the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in habeas corpus
proceedings.
Mapp was eroded in Michigan v. DeFillppo,89 in which the
court considered an ordinance that made it a substantive offense for
a person lawfully stopped by the police to refuse to identify himself.
The respondent in DeFillippo refused to identify himself and was
81. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
82. 422 U.S. at 538.
83. Id at 539 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
84. Id at 542.
85. Id at 552 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For an interesting account of what was apparently perceived by the liberal wing of the Court as a subterfuge by Justice Rehnquist, see S.
WOODWARD & B. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 383-84 (1979).

86. 422 U.S. 1055 (1975). See note 11 supra
87. 43 U.S.L.W. 3861 (1975).
88. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In a dissent, Justice White stated that he would
not limit the application of the rule in habeas corpus proceedings. Id at 537-38 (White, J.,
dissenting).
89. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).

arrested and searched. The search netted controlled substances. The
Michigan Court of Appeals held that the arrest and search were invalid and that the statute was unconstitutional.' The United States
Supreme Court reversed because the officer had probable cause to
believe that a crime was being committed: "At that time . . . there
was no controlling precedent that this ordinance was or was not constitutional. . . .A prudent officer should not have been required to
anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional."'" Chief Justice Burger distinguished DeFillippo from cases
striking down a statute authorizing an illegal search.9 2 The ordinance created a substantive offense and did not authorize a search
prohibited by the fourth amendment.9 3
Disregarding Chief Justice Burger's efforts to distinguish the ordinance in DeFillippo from statutes authorizing illegal searches, one
can argue that the Court's reasoning should apply to situations now
controlled by Mapp. For example, in his dissent in Stone v. Powell,9 4
Justice White hypothesized that in particular situations an officer
could make a good faith judgment that probable cause exists to
search or arrest and a later judicial review could determine that no
probable cause actually existed.9 5 Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger cited the good faith rule as applied in civil suits against police as
additional support for application of a good faith rule in DeFilIWO. 96 Since the rationale for the exclusionary rule is deterrence of
police misconduct,9 7 the arguments in DeFillppo should apply
equally to all fourth amendment claims.
3. United States v. Williams.-Recently, in United States v.
Williams,98 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, effectively overruled Mapp. Defendant Williams pleaded guilty to possession of heroin. While an appeal of a denial of her pretrial motion
to suppress was pending before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Williams was released on bond subject to the condition that she remain in Ohio.9 9 Subsequently, in Atlanta, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration saw her depart from a nonstop flight from
Los Angeles. With knowledge of the conditions of her release in
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id at 34.
Id at 37-38.
See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979).
443 U.S. at 39.
428 U.S. 465 (1976).

95. Id at 540. Justice White maintained that "when this Court divides five to four on
issues of probable cause, it is not tenable to conclude that the officer was at fault or acted
unreasonably in making the arrest." Id
96. 443 U.S. at 38.
97. Id at 38 n.3.
98. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 946 (1980).
99. Id at 833.

Ohio, the agent confronted her and, after she gave unsatisfactory answers to his questions, arrested her for violating the release order. 100
A search incident to arrest produced a packet of heroin from her coat
pocket. Williams was in custody when the agent procured a search
warrant for her luggage, and the search revealed a large quantity of
heroin. 10
After she was indicted for possession of heroin with intent to
distribute,' z Williams moved to suppress the evidence on the
ground that her arrest was unlawful. A magistrate recommended
that the motion be denied, but the district court suppressed the evidence and a panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 0 3 The court dion its own motion and reversed the panel's earlier
rected a rehearing
°4
decision.

The court agreed that the arrest was legal, that the search of
Williams' person was lawful, and that there was probable cause for
the search warrant. 0 5 Presumably, any further discussion of the exclusionary rule was moot. In the opinion, however, thirteen judges
discussed the status of the exclusionary rule.' " They found remiss
the panel's refusal to consider the agent's reasonable and honest belief that he was authorized to make the arrest, 0 7 citing authorities
advocating the good-faith rule'0 8 and the argument that "[ilt makes
no sense to speak of deterring police officers who acted in the goodfaith belief that their conduct was legal by suppressing evidence derived from such actions unless we somehow wish to deter them from
acting at all."' 9 The opinion of the thirteen judges discussed the
Supreme Court cases in which deterrence was balanced against the
cost of application of the rule and concluded that the good-faith exception espoused in Williams was similar."i 0 They argued that the
Supreme Court had essentially adopted the good-faith exception in
technical violation cases since at least four Supreme Court Justices
would adopt the good-faith rule."' Although much of Williams is
dicta, it reflects the extent of Mapp's erosion.
100. Id at 834.
101. Id at 834-35.
102. Williams was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
103. 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979).
104. Id at 98. The decision en banc is truly unique. Judge Rubin noted in his special
concurrence that "[t]he twenty-four of us are rarely unanimous." 622 F.2d at 848 (Rubin, J.,
concurring opinion in which nine judges joined).
105. 622 F.2d at 833.
106. Id at 840.
107. "In the panel's view, [the agent's] reasonable belief, held in unquestioned good faith,
that he was authorized to arrest Williams cut no figure in the analysis." Id
108. Id at 841.
109. Id at 842.
110. Id at 842-43.
111. Id at 841. Judge Rubin, however, pointed out in a special concurrence that "five
members of the Court up to now have not suggested [the rule's] qualification, and they constitute a majority." Id at 849.

The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Williams. 112 It is difficult to imagine a less likely case in which certiorari would be
granted. The possibility that Justices Brennan and Marshall would
vote to grant certiorari is doubtful because they believe it would be
rash to give the Court the opportunity to dismantle Mapp. "3 Members of the Court willing to overrule or modify Mapp would prefer to
do so in a case in which they will not be subject to the criticism

leveled at the Mapp majority for unnecessarily overruling Wolf" 4
The Fifth Circuit judges who see Mapp tottering may well sense
the direction of the Supreme Court despite the denial of certiorari.
Although only four Supreme Court Justices have expressed a willingness to overrule or modify Mapp, a fifth can be considered an
unenthusiastic supporter of the rule." 5 President Reagan's first appointment to the Court may provide the fifth. vote." 6 Williams
clearly illustrates the continual erosion of Mapp, and foreshadows
the bleak future of the exclusionary rule.
III.

Is the Cost Too Great?

Before Mapp is overruled, the Supreme Court should question
whether the assumed costs of the rule are as great as represented by
Mapp's critics. "7 A report by the Comptroller General's Office ana112. 49 U.S.L.W. 3531 (1981).
113. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protectiono/IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977).
114. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 674 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Black's concurring and dissenting opinion in Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493 (1971). See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85
(1979) (dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in which Justice Blackmun joined).
116. See note 2 supra,
117. It is the authors' view that the arguments against the exclusionary rule are generally
suspect. Mapp however, has been defended elsewhere. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectiveson
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974); Kamisar, Is The Exclusionary Rule an
"lllogical'or 'Unnatural'Interpretationofthe FourthAmendment, 62 JUDICATURE 67 (1978).
An observation concerning the good faith test is in order. The efforts of the courts to
discipline police are at best difficult. See generally Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the
Rights ofSuspects in CriminalCases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785 (1970). A defendant has difficulty
overcoming police testimony concerning his conduct during a search or arrest. Id at 789-90.
But see Israel, CriminalProcedure,the Burger Court and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1319 (1977). The police view fourth amendment limitations with hostility, and
at least some police justify perjuring themselves "to subvert 'liberal' rules of law that might
free those who 'ought' to be jailed." Younger, The PerjuryRoutine, The Nation, May 8, 1967,
at 596-97. At the most, the defendant's testimony creates a credibility battle, which is usually
lost by the defendant. Unless he persuades the police to admit ill-will or bad-faith, the defendant may have little evidence available to counter police representations of their good faith.
Products liability in tort law provides an analogy. A plaintiff is often powerless to prove a
negligent act committed by a large corporate defendant that places many products on the
market; however, because deterrence is an important goal of tort law, courts have adopted
strict liability in many products liability cases. Even though a defendant may not be at fault in
some cases, the increased possibility of plaintiff's recovery causes manufacturers to be more
careful in producing their products. See SPI.SER, LAWSUr, ch. 5 (1980). Criminal justice,
therefore, may be better served by increasing the rule's penalty, not by diminishing it. Even if
critics lament the unverifiable deterrent value of the rule, a good faith rule diminishes
whatever deterrence the rule may provide.

lyzed 2,804 cases in 1978.118 Approximately 30 percent of the sample
involved a search and seizure, but only 11 percent of the defendants
filed a fourth amendment motion to suppress. The report concluded
' 19
that "the overwhelming majority of [those] motions were denied." "
Evidence was suppressed on fourth amendment grounds in only 1.3
percent of 2,804 cases and despite suppression of some evidence, 12a0
conviction was nonetheless obtained in over half of those cases.
The report also considered that a possible hidden cost of the exclusionary rule is that the United States attorneys decline to prosecute
cases if they believe that evidence has been illegally obtained. Although prosecution was declined in about 46 percent of all cases
screened, search and seizure problems were cited as the primary reason in only about 0.4 percent of the total cases declined.' 2 ' A Law
(LEAA) study of felony cases
Enforcement Assistance Agency
22
results.'
low
yielded similarly
A.

State Appellate Court Study

A research project was conducted by the authors to examine the
exclusionary rule as applied at the state appellate court level. The
study was intended to determine whether state courts applied the
rule consistently. Several variables were considered. The results of
the study are further evidence that the cost of the exclusionary rule
has been overstated.
1. Method of Research.-Four reporters within the West Reporter System were used to obtain a cross section of the state courts
and their respective treatment of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule.' 23 Only United States Constitution fourth amendment criminal
search and seizure cases were examined. The time periods surveyed
were the years 1964, 1969, 1974 and 1979, which were chosen as representative of the changing attitude toward Mapp. By 1964, Mapp
began to have an effect on the nature of criminal appeals in the state
courts. In the later years, the gradual erosion of the exclusionary
in such cases as Calandra,
rule by the United States Supreme Court
24
evident.
was
Powell
and
Janis,
Peltier,
The factors considered in each case were the crime committed,
the personality of the individual defendant, the police conduct in118. REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL ON THE IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS (1979).
119. Id at 1.
120. Id at 11.
121. Id at 13-14.
122. See note 32 and accompanying text supra
123. The Reporters used were as follows: (1) Atlantic Reporter, (2) California Reporter,
(3) Southwestern Reporter, and (4) Northwestern Reporter.
124. See notes 56-97 and accompanying text supra.

volved, and the sentence received. A total of 613 cases were included in the study and although not all of the cases revealed the
same type of information, the data yielded significant correlations.
2. Results
(a) All reporters -

allyears

(1) Seriousness of the crime.-The statistics compiled for all
the regions over all four years indicate that 54 percent of the cases in
which the appellate courts excluded evidence because of fourth
amendment violations involved narcotics. 2 A negative correlation
exists between the seriousness of the narcotics offense and the rate of
application of fourth amendment principles. Courts suppressed evidence least often in cases of sale of dangerous drugs 26 and suppressed evidence most frequently in cases of possession of
marijuana. 2 7 In sale of marijuana and possession of dangerous
drugs cases, the exclusionary rule was applied at 33 percent and 47
percent levels, respectively.
Throughout the sample, the prevailing rule was that the more
serious the crime, the fewer the applications of the exclusionary
rule. 128 Among the most serious crimes, evidence was suppressed in
23 percent of armed robbery cases, 21 percent .of rape cases, and 13
percent of homicide cases. 129 The frequency of application of the
rule in possession of marijuana cases, the least serious offense, is four
times the rate of application in homicide cases. Similarly, compilations for victim versus victimless crimes over the four years reveal a
20 percent application rate of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule for all victim crimes, but a 36 percent application rate for vic130
timless crimes.
Initially, the 13 percent application rate in homicide cases may
125. The exclusionary rule was applied in 175 cases; 94 of those cases involved narcotics.
See Appendix I.
126. Evidence was suppressed in only 27% of such cases, or 9 of 33 cases examined.
127. Evidence was suppressed in 52% of possession of marijuana cases, or 33 of 64 cases
examined.
128. For purposes of this article, "seriousness" rises as the danger resulting from the use of
the drug rises, and also refers to the culpability of the transaction. Sale is more culpable than
possession. For a similar scale of seriousness, see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:21-4 to 24:21-8.1 and
§§ 24:21-19 to 24:21-20 (West Supp. 1980).
129. Evidence was suppressed in 7 of3l armed robbery cases, 3 of 14 rape cases, and I I of
83 homicide cases.
130. For purposes of this article, the following crimes are considered "victim crimes":
homicide, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, burglary, theft, assault and battery, arson, and
receiving stolen goods. "Victimless crimes" includes all narcotics offenses, gambling, possession of a weapon, and possession of burglary tools. For a general discussion of the problems
surrounding classification of victim and nonvictim crimes, see WIor & LEWIS, MODERN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33-52 (1978).

appear to be high. Indeed, if one of every seven or eight murderers
were released because the constable blundered, the argument that
the cost to society is great would be supported. The sample deals,
however, only with crimes in whic4 evidence was seized and the defendant appealed. Perhaps the most significant consideration is the
frequency with which some of the surveyed courts affirm without an
opinion. 131 The absence of an opinion made it impractical to determine whether the case involved a fourth amendment claim. Adding
those figures would substantially lower the frequency in all cases in

which the exclusionary rule was applied.' 32
(2) Miligatingfactors.-The State Appellate Court Survey also
examined homicide and possession of marijuana cases to determine
whether the rule was applied evenhandedly despite what may appear
to be mitigating facts. Although difficult to quantify, the details of

specific cases often indicate that justice is not seriously impaired
when the exclusionary rule is applied in homicide cases. Many of
the homicide cases in which the exclusionary rule was applied can be

partially explained either as responses to the fundamental unfairness
of the conviction because the defendant's guilt was seriously in
doubt, or as tokens because sufficient evidence remained to convict
the defendant on retrial.3 3 At the other end of the spectrum, possession of marijuana cases in which the court did not apply the exclusionary rule tended to involve a very small penalty 134 or a defendant
with either prior convictions or a criminal reputation with the po131. The following courts' per curiam decisions without written opinions were examined:
the Supreme Court and Superior Courts of Connecticut; the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia; the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine; the Court of Appeals of Maryland; the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire; the Supreme and Superior Courts of New Jersey; the
Supreme and Superior Courts of Pennsylvania; the Supreme Court of Rhode Island; the
Supreme Court of Vermont; the Supreme Court of Michigan; the Supreme Courts of Arkansas
and Tennessee; the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of Kentucky and Missouri; the Court
of Criminal Appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas. Both the California Supreme Court
and the Courts of Appeals for the First and Fourth Districts render decisions without opinion
on occasion.

132. Most per curiam decisions without written opinions are rendered in appeals by defendants, not the prosecution. Thus, numerous fourth amendment claims by defendants are
unreported.
133. See, e.g., Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 320, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974); People v. Blair, 25
Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979); People v. Farley, 90 Cal. App. 3d 851, 153
Cal. Rptr. 695 (1979); State v. Peterson, - Iowa -, 219 N.W.2d 665 (1974); Trevathan v. Commonwealth, - Ky. -, 384 S.W.2d 500 (1964); People v. White, 692 Mich. 404, 221 N.W.2d 357
(1974); Commonwealth v. Strickland, 457 Pa. 631, 326 A.2d 379 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Wright, 415 Pa. 55, 202 A.2d 79 (1964).
134. Cases involving a small penalty are as follows: People v. Soberanes, 97 Cal. App. 3d
811, 159 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1979); People v. Figueroa, 268 Cal. App. 2d 721, 74 Cal. Rptr. 74
(1969); People v. Weitzer, 269 Cal. App. 2d 274, 75 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1969); In re Donaldson, 269
Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); People v. Mermuys, 2 Cal. App. 2d 1083, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 902 (1969); State v. Barclay, 398 A.2d 794 (Me. 1979); Smith v. State, 577 S.W.22 782 (Ct.
Civ. App. Tex. 1979); Christian v. State, 504 S.W.2d 865 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1974); In Inter-

est of L.L., 90 Wis. 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (1979).

lice.' 35 These explanations account for 73 percent of the successful
homicide appeals and 61 percent of the unsuccessful marijuana appeals. The assertion that the application of the exclusionary rule is a
function of the seriousness of the offense is therefore supported.
Finally, the study examined cases in which the defendant had
some prior contact with either the police or the criminal justice system. The overall application rate of the rule during the four years
surveyed was 29 percent of a total of 613 cases. When the defendant
had prior contacts with police or the criminal justice system, the rule
was applied in only 18 percent of the cases.
In summary, the results of the State Appellate Court Study, considered in conjunction with the Comptroller General's Report' 36 and
the LEAA Study,' 37 indicate that the cost to society exacted by the
exclusionary rule has been greatly exaggerated. 1 38 The evidence
supports the assertion that if the application of the rule would result
in the release of a criminal charged with a serious offense, or a defendant previously involved in criminal activity, the courts are reluc39

tant to exclude evidence under the fourth amendment.'

8. All reporters - trends 1964-1979. -The State Appellate
Court Study also compared data from all reporters for each year to
determine whether any trends existed. Generalization about indi135. Cases involving defendants with prior convictions or a criminal reputation are as
follows: People v. Rafter, 41 Cal. App. 3d 557, 116 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1974); People v. Randal,
226 Cal. App. 2d 105, 37 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1964); People v. Jefferson, 230 Cal. App. 2d 151, 40
Cal. Rptr. 715 (1964); State v. Reader, 328 A.2d 146 (Super. Ct. Del. 1974); People v. Herrera,
19 Mich. App. 216, 172 N.W.2d 529 (1969); State v. Rohrer, 589 S.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. Mo.
1979); State v. Bollinger, 405 A.2d 433 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1979); Mull v. State, 510 S.W.2d 358
(Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1974).
136. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
137. See note 33 and accompanying text supra
138. See notes 148-158 and accompanying text infra.
139. Some specific cases indicate that in close decisions the facts may sway the appellate
court. See, e.g., State v. Pinegar, 583 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); State v. Smith, 43 N.J.
65, 202 A.2d 669 (1964). At times, the analysis seems incorrect. For example, in State v.
Chapman, 250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969), the police made a warrantless search of the defendant's
home ten hours after he had been arrested for the murder of his wife. The crime scene had
been further secured with a police guard. In upholding the search, the court relied heavily on
the balancing test of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its standard of reasonableness. The
Maine court quoted at length from Terry stating,
We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, . . . or that in most instances failure to comply with the requirement can only
be excused by exigent circumstances. .. . But we deal here with an entire rubric of
police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical
matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription
against unreasonablesearches and seizures.
250 A.2d at 209 (emphasis added). Chapman did not involve "necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat"; rather, it involved an instance in which prior judicial approval was practicable. Nevertheless, the Chapman search
was upheld as being reasonable. The result seems a bit strained, especially considering the
apparent irrelevance of Terry.

vidual offenses is difficult, but a trend is discernible if percentageapplication figures for victim and victimless crimes are compared.

This analysis reveals a decline in application rate in victim crimes
and a rise in victimless crimes.1t4
Individual crimes do not consistently conform to the general
trend. For example, application of the rule in narcotics cases was
highest in 1964, when courts suppressed evidence in 49 percent of all
reported cases. The rate declined to 41 percent in 1969 and 23 percent in 1974, before rising to 45 percent in 1979.14 Homicide fluctuated from an application rate of 22 percent in 1964, to 0 percent in
1969, to 22 percent in 1974, and finally to 10 percent in 1979.142 Similarly, fluctuation was observed in rape 43 and in armed robbery
cases. 144
Despite the fluctuations within a class of cases, the data suggest
trends within the victim and victimless crime categories. The decline
in applications of the rule in victim cases is dramatic, from 34 percent in 1964 to 17 percent in 1979.1 After an initial decline from 37

percent in 1964 to 26 percent in 1969, application of the rule in victimless crimes rose steadily, climbing to 31 percent in 1974 and 44
percent in 1979.1' The trend illustrates that the social cost of the
exclusionary rule has been exaggerated. Dangerous criminals are
apparently less likely
to benefit from the rule today than they were
14 7
ago.
years
fifteen
140. See Appendix II.
141. The statistics are as follows: 18 applications in 37 cases in 1964; 18 in 44 cases in
1969; 16 in 59 cases in 1974; and 42 in 94 cases in 1979.
142. The statistics are as follows: 2 applications in 9 cases in 1964; 9 in 9 cases in 1969; 5
in 23 cases in 1974; and 4 in 42 cases in 1979.
143. The statistics are as follows: 0 applications in only one case in 1964, and I in 1969; 1
in 2 cases in 1974; and 2 in 10 cases in 1979.
144. The statistics are as follows: 2 applications in 6 cases in 1964; 0 in 7 cases in 1969; 2
in 8 cases in 1974; and 3 in 10 cases in 1979.
145. The statistics are as follows: 10 applications in 29 cases in 1964; 11 in 55 cases in
1969; 14 in 68 cases in 1974; and 22 in 129 cases in 1979.
146. The statistics are as follows: 18 applications in 49 cases in 1964; 19 in 74 cases in
1969; 28 in 89 cases in 1974; and 53 in 120 cases in 1979.
147. A comparison of the four regions of the country shows relatively little deviation from
the national trend. California showed a small increase in applications of the rule in victim
crimes between 1964 (18%) and 1969 (29%), but has remained at that level (27% in 1974 and in
1979). California showed a curious decline in application in nonvictim crimes, from 41% in
1964 and 37% in 1969, to only 12.5% in 1974.
The statistics compiled from the Northwestern Reporter suggest that the states in that
region have either law abiding police or courts that take a narrow view of the fourth amendment. After no application of the rule in 1964, the courts applied the exclusionary rule in 14%
of victim crime cases in 1969, 15% in 1974, and 3%in 1979. Although application was more
frequent in victimless crimes - 50% in 1964, 23% in 1969, 27% in 1974, and 19% in 1979 - the
statistics showed a decline in application, contrary to the composite of the four regions.
The Southwestern Reporter was similar to the composite for all four regions. Application
of the rule in nonvictim crimes increased from 0% in 1964 and in 1969, to 25% in 1974, and
53% in 1979. The sample for victim crimes was small. It declined from 100% application in
1964 to 9% in 1969, but rose to 16% in 1974 and 22% in 1979.

3. Analysis of Results. -The study was not intended to prove
the frequency with which appellate courts upheld defendants' fourth
amendment claims. The data reveals only the percentage of reported cases in which the exclusionary rule was applied. In jurisdictions such as Pennsylvania, in which affirmance may be announced
without opinion, the state supreme and superior courts certainly rejected numerous fourth amendment claims.'4 8 The data of the State
Appellate Court Study does not include such cases because the appellants' contentions are also unreported. Thus, the data likely inflate the frequency of application of the exclusionary rule.
The results of the study suggest the following correlations: (1) a
negative correlation between severity of the crime and suppression of
evidence and (2) a negative correlation between the number of defendant's with prior criminal records and their successes on appeal.
Furthermore, the data indicates the following trends: a decline in
application of the rule in victim crimes and an increase in victimless
crimes. The research does not prove causation, but at least four explanations for the results are plausible.
First, the police may be more cautious when they gather evidence in serious cases than they are when they perform the same task
in nonserious cases. Serious offenses are more likely to draw the attention of superiors, the press, and the public' 49 and prosecutors are
certainly more interested in pursuing serious cases. 5 ° The different
suppression rates may indicate that the police are able to comply
with the law when motivated to do so. Thus, the exclusionary rule
may deter illegal police conduct when the release of a serious offender is at stake. This conclusion is plausible, but not readily subject to statistical proof. The possibility that the rule has more
deterrent effect as the seriousness of the offense increases militates in
favor of retention, especially in the investigation of heinous
crimes.' 5 1 The decline in application in victim offenses is consistent
with the notion that the rule deters police misconduct. The trend
may be explained by increased sensitivity to fourth amendment values as the police become more familiar with its requirements.
A second explanation is that police officers who investigate serious crimes are often more experienced than those who investigate
148. For example, a review of Volume 413 of the Atlantic Reporter indicates that in an
overwhelming majority of cases, the appellant is the defendant, and seldom the Commonwealth, e.g., 61 of 63 appeals to the Superior and Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania. It is not
known how many of the appellants raised fourth amendment claims.
149. See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process.- Low Visibility
Decisions in the Administrationof.Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 554-73 (1960).
150. See generally LaFave, The Prosecutor'sDiscretion in the United States, 18 AM. J.
COMP. L. 532, 533-39 (1970).
151. This suggestion is directly contrary to proposals made by one scholar. See Kaplan,
The Linits of the ExclusionaryRule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974).

petty offenses. The exclusionary rule may therefore have an educa52
tional effect. This is consistent with the view that the rule deters.
The experienced officer promoted to a major felony unit or to detective may have sufficient career aspirations and professional pride to
conform to fourth amendment requirements and avoid adverse publicity for his police department.
A third possibility is that the police are more willing to perjure
themselves to preserve a conviction in a serious case than in a nonserious case. 153 Further research in this area is extremely difficult
because of the inherent bias of the subject of the research.' 5 4 The
police are unlikely to confess their lawlessness to a researcher. It is
anomalous, however, that police perjury is cited as a reason to abandon the exclusionary rule. Even if an effective alternative to the rule
is propounded,'5 5 the incentive to perjure oneself is a continuing
one. If a good-faith test were adopted, an officer could misrepresent
his motives or knowledge at the time of the contested search or
seizure. The motive to falsify the facts in a civil damage suit against
the officer is greater than when the available remedy does not involve personal loss. The possibility of a recovery from the municipality or the police department may motivate the officer to perjure
himself and avoid the opprobrium that may result if substantial
damages are awarded. An officer may perjure himself in a criminal
case to save society from a person who he knows is guilty; a similar
rationale may produce perjured testimony in a civil case to prevent
the unjust enrichment of the same criminal.
Finally, the data may be explained by the desire of appellate
152. If this explanation is correct, it would contradict one of Chief Justice Burger's criticisms of Mapp:
Whatever educational effect the rule conceivably might have in theory is greatly diminished in fact by the realities of law enforcement work. Policemen do not have the
time, inclination, or training to read and grasp the nuances of the appellate opinions
that ultimately define the standards of conduct they are to follow. The issues that
these decisions resolve often admit of neither easy nor obvious answers, as sharply
divided courts on what is or is not 'reasonable" amply demonstrate. Nor can judges,
in all candor, forget that opinions sometii~es lack helpful clarity.
The presumed educational effect of judicial opinions is also reduced by the long
time lapse-often several years---between the original police action and its final judicial evaluation. Given a policeman's pressing responsibilities, it would be surprising
if he ever becomes aware of the final result after such a delay.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 417 (1971).
153. One criticism of the exclusionary rule is that it encourages police perjury. Wilkey,
The Exclusionary Rule.- Why Suppress Valid Evidence? 62 JUDICATURE 215, 226 (1978). See
also Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives,
[1975] WASH.U. L.Q. 621, 673-74.

154. Schlesinger, The ExclusionaryRule. Have Proponents Proven That It Is a Deterrent to
Police 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979).
155. Critics of the rule agree that some effective alternative must be developed. See, e.g.,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence, 62 JUDICATURE 45
(1978); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free ifthe Constable Blunders4 50 Tax. L. REv. 736
(1972).

judges to protect society from dangerous criminals. Result-orientation is not foreign to our judicial system. The same judges may be
sympathetic to defendants, especially nonrecidivists, who are
charged with victimless crimes. For example, an appellate judge
who doubts the wisdom of drug laws can reduce their harshness by
invoking the exclusionary rule when the defendant is charged only
with possession.
If society is dissatisfied with the substantive criminal law, it is
arguable that the suppression of evidence is an inappropriate remedy
and that the offensive laws should be repealed. 5 6 Pending a legislative remedy, however, judges must attempt to do justice to the litigants before them. A softening of societal attitudes may come too
late for the criminal defendant forced to serve time on a petty offense. 57 Thus, despite the merits of the view that the legislature is
the correct source of legal reform, judges may be tempted to use an
available remedy to mitigate harsh results.
Although judges may be criticized for result-orientation, it is
unrealistic to believe that they can ever be entirely free of it.'5 8 A
more serious problem is that result-orientation defeats the purposes
of the exclusionary rule. Diminished application of the rule as seriousness of the offense increases does not necessarily undercut the
deterrent rationale. Courts still release some serious offenders. Sporadic application of the rule in serious cases may deter police misconduct as much as frequent applications in less serious cases. Thus,
even if result-orientation is a partial explanation of the data, this
judicial attitude may not seriously undermine the purpose of the
rule.
IV.

Conclusion

Critics of the exclusionary rule argue that the cost to society is
"great and real."' 5 9 The results of the State Appellate Court Study
156. Wright, supra note 15, at 740.
157. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 332 A.2d 521 (1974),
rev'd, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977). The defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Riggins, a married man, age twenty-one, with several small children, had no prior criminal record. He possessed 53.9 grams of marijuana (about 2 ounces).
He was sentenced to 2 to 5 years and received a $100 fine. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
subsequently remanded and held for the first time that trial courts had to explain on the record

the reasons for sentencing. Id One of the dissenters in the superior court noted that elsewhere
in Pennsylvania the defendant would have been given a short probationary period with the
possibility of expungement of the record if the probation were completed successfully. 232 Pa.
Super. Ct. at 39 n.6, 332 A.2d at 525 n.6 (Hoffman, J., dissenting). Professor Wright's argument would make little sense to one sentenced under laws that have lost public support.
158. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARmSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979), which provides insight into the Justices' efforts to reach principled decisions that conform to their political concerns.
159. Wright, Must the Cr'minalGo Free I/the Constable Blunders 50 TEx. L. REv. 736,
741 (1976). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

indicate, however, that the cost has been overstated. The exclusion
of trial evidence is infrequent and prison doors are not being opened
to release masses of dangerous criminals. As long as the fourth
amendment requires an effective remedy, unreasonable police practices will extract a toll from society." 6 Nevertheless, before the
foundation of Mapp v. Ohio is totally eroded and the Supreme Court
abandons Mapp's holding, the available data suggest that the Court
reexamine whether the cost of the exclusionary rule has been accurately reported.

160. Even if Congress, state legislatures, or courts substitute a good faith test, criminals
will be released, despite the existence of otherwise highly probative but illegally seized evidence. Appellate courts currently apply a result-oriented approach, finding against serious
offenders unless police conduct is egregious. It is likely that similar practices would evolve
under a good faith test and render that approach ineffective because of inconsistent application.

APPENDIX I
STATE APPELLATE COURTS' APPLICATION RATE OF
EXCLUSIONARY RULE BY CRIME
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